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Loss of parental consortium is a cause of action which allows a
child to recover damages against third parties who tortiously injure a
child’s parent.’
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I. Introduction
Loss of parental consortium is a cause of action which allows a
child to recover damages against third parties who tortiously injure a
child's parent.' Specifically, it provides a method of recovery for loss of
parental "care, comfort, society and . . . companionship."2 The child's
recovery for loss of parental consortium is distinct from the parent's
recovery of lost wages which already provides for the child's economic
losses, such as food, clothing and shelter. The parent's recovery from
the same tortfeasor replaces the money the parent would have earned
and used to support his child.
In 1976, the Florida Second District Court of Appeal declined to
recognize a child's right to recover for lost parental consortium in
Clark v. Suncoast Hospital, Inc.3 In 1979, and again in 1982, the
Third District Court of Appeal issued per curiam decisions, following
Clark without analysis.4 In 1984, however, the Fifth District Court of
Appeal, recognizing the signs of changing societal needs, and the be-
ginnings of a trend, broke new ground in Florida by permitting a child
to recover for lost parental consortium in Rosen by and through Rosen
v. Zorzos.5 The Rosen Court certified its decision to the Florida Su-
preme Court since it is in direct conflict with the Clark decision.6 The
Supreme Court has the opportunity to settle the conflict currently ex-
isting among the districts.
This note presents a general history of a child's right to recover for
1. See, e.g., Rosen by and through Rosen v. Zorzos, 449 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
2. Id. at 360.
3. 338 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
4. Fayden v. Guerrero, 420 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Ramirez v.
Comm'l Union Ins. Co., 369 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
5. 449 So. 2d at 359.
6. The Florida Supreme Court has discretionary jurisdiction to review a district
court decision "that is certified by it to be in direct conflict with a decision of another
district court of appeal." FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(4).
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lost parental consortium in the United States, in general, and Florida
in particular. The note traces the development of other relevant Florida
law as a comparison. Finally, the article will review the arguments for
and against acceptance of the derivative action which were raised in
Clark and Rosen.7
II. Historical Development of Children's Rights
In 1894, a child named Mary Ellen8 lived in New York City. Her
mother and father had beaten and starved Mary Ellen routinely. An
interested social worker tried to protect the child but found there were
no laws against child abuse. The social worker's compassion inspired
her to find a way to protect the right of the child from abuse. Appalled
that New York City protected its dogs and cats better than its children,
the social worker went to the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals for help. She convinced the Society that children are a specie
of animal and Mary Ellen, a child, was entitled to protection as an
animal from cruelty and abuse. The state successfully prosecuted the
parents under then existing cruelty to animals laws. Subsequent public-
ity prompted the enactment of child abuse laws throughout the coun-
try.9 However, it was the court, not the legislature, who protected little
7. In addition to the parties, amicus curiae briefs have been filed by the Florida
Defense Lawyers Asociation, the Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers, and the Ameri-
can Trial Lawyers Association; Marjorie G. Graham, Post Office Drawer E, West
Palm Beach, Florida, 33402; Professor Michael L. Richmond, Nova University Center
for the Study of Law, 3100 S.W. Ninth Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 33315 (for
defendant/petitioner); Richard A. Kupfer, Esquire, Cone, Wagner, Nugent, Johnson,
Hazouri & Roth, Post Office Box 3466, West Palm Beach, Florida, 33402 (for AFTL);
Richard A. Kupfer; David S. Schrager, Esquire, co-counsel ATLA President, 17th
Floor, 810 Center Plaza, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 19103 (for ATLA).
8. See generally L. HOULGATE, THE CHILD & THE STATE xi (1980); Paulsen,
Legal Protections Against Child Abuse, 13 CHILDREN 42 (1966); B. GRUMET, THE
PLAINTIFFS: VICTIMS OF THE BATTERED CHILD SYNDROME, THE YOUNGEST MINORITY
I (S. Katz ed. 1974).
9. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 5101 (1978); FLA. STAT. § 415.501 (1983); see also
ALA. CODE § 26-14-2 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.010 (1979); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13.3552 (1978); 1983 ARK. ACTS § 42-807; CAL. [PENAL] CODE § 273a (Deer-
ing 1984); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-102 (1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-21 (1983);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 301 (1982); FLA. STAT. § 768.21 (1983); GA. CODE ANN. §
49-5 (1984); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 350 (1983); IDAHO CODE § 16-1601 (1983); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 23 § 2052 (Smith-Hurd 1983); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-11 (Burns
1984); IOWA CODE § 235 (1984); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38.716 (1981); KY. REV. STAT.
§ 405.030 (1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 403 (West 1984); ME. REV. STAT.
[Vol. 9
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Mary Ellen.
Common law did not recognize the legal rights of wives and chil-
dren as being on par with the rights of a man. The legal relationship
between parent and child was essentially that of servant to master."0 In
fact, a man's dominion over his family was so absolute that a woman
who killed her husband was not only subject to punishment for murder,
but also for petit treason."' Ancient Greek and Roman fathers had the
right to kill unwanted or defective children or to allow the children to
die from starvation or exposure by leaving them in a field or on a hill-
side.1 2 At the beginning of this century, a sixteen year old American
boy was sent to reform school for an infraction which would have re-
sulted in a twenty-five cents to one dollar fine if it had been committed
by an adult.'3 His crime was swearing at a church meeting.
Common law afforded no protection to children except as property
owned by the parents.' 4 Children owed their labor to their father.'6 A
child could not sue his parents for committing torts against the child.' 6
Parents had no statutory duty to support their children prior to the
ANN. tit. 15 § 3501 (1983); MD. [Crimes & Punishment] CODE ANN. § 35A (1983)
tit. 27; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119 § 1 (West 1984); MICH. COMP. LAWS §
722.561, (1984); MINN. STAT. § 260 (1984); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-15 (1983
Supp.); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.125 (Vernon 1984); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3 (1984);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-707 (1977); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.501 (1983); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 169-C-2 (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN § 9:6-8.8 (West 1984); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 30-6-1 (1984); N.Y. (Soc. Serv.) LAW § 411 (McKinney 1983); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 7A-542 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1 (1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2151.01 (Page 1983); OKLA STAT. tit. 21, § 843 (1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 418.740
(1983); 11 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2202 (Purdon 1984); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11
(1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-10 (Law Co-op. 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §
26-10 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-402 (1983); TEX. (Fam.) CODE ANN. § 34.05
(Vernon 1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-19 (1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 § 1351
(1984); VA. CODE § 63.1-248 (1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.010 (1984); W.
VA. CODE 49-6 (1984); Wis. STAT. § 940.201 (1983); Wyo. STAT. § 14-3-201 (1978).
10. See, e.g., F. POLLOCK, EXPANSION OF THE COMMON LAW 150-51 (1904); T.
PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 545 (5th ed. 1956).
11. See F. POLLOCK, supra note 10, at 151.
12. See, e.g., B. GRUMET, supra note 8.
13. Roberts v. State, 82 Neb. 651, 118 N.W. 574 (1908).
14. See, e.g., Wilkie v. Roberts, 91 Fla. 1064, 109 So. 225 (1926).
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891); but see Ard v.
Ard, 414 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 1982) and Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 471 P.2d 282
(1970), which propound the view that a parent may be liable to his children for negli-
gently-caused injuries.
1984]
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passing of the British Statute, 43rd Elizabeth Ch. 2."7 Similarly, mod-
ern parents have a right to the earnings of their minor children, and
can even sue to recover those earnings from third parties whose wrong-
ful conduct deprive them of the earnings."' Courts recognized a man's
right to sue third parties for wrongfully causing familial loss of consor-
tium as early as 1619 in England 9 and 1852 in America. 0 Society
thought that a man's right to his family's society and fellowship was so
important to his well-being that negligent or intentional interference
was actionable.
American courts first protected a wife's right to her husband's so-
ciety in 1950 in Hittafer v. Argonne Co.2 The Hittafer court allowed a
woman to recover against her husband's employer for negligently-in-
flicted injuries. In Hitaffer, the court merely applied standard negli-
gence and proximate cause tests in holding that an employer was liable
for a wife's loss of her husband's consortium when the husband was
injured by the employer's negligence.22 Gates v. Foley2" gave the Flor-
ida Supreme Court an opportunity to recognize the right of a woman to
recover for loss of her husband's consortium in 1971. Writing for an
unanimous court, Justice Adkins said, "[m]edieval concepts which have
no justification in our present society should be rejected. 24 With that
decision, Florida became the twenty-fifth state to recognize a wife's
right to recover for loss of her husband's consortium.25
17. See, e~g., Borchet v. Borchet, 185 Md. 586, 45 A.2d 463, 465 (1946); see
also I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *449.
18. See, e.g., Lessard v. Great Falls Woolen Co., 83 N.H. 576, 578, 145 A. 782,
784 (1929); Youngblood v. Taylor, 89 So. 2d 503, 506 (Fla. 1956); Wilkie, 91 Fla. at
1064, 109 So. at 225; Tucker v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co. of Shelby, Ohio, 343 So. 2d 1357
(Fla. 1977).
19. Hyde v. Scyssor, 79 Eng. Rep. 462 (1619).
20. See Fuller v. Naugatuk R. Co., 21 Conn. 557 (1852).
21. Hittafer, 87 App. D.C. at 57, 183 F.2d at 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950), overruled
on other grounds, Smither & Co. v. Coles, 100 App. D.C. 68, 242 F.2d 220, cert.
denied, 354 U.S. 914 (1957).
22. Id.
23. Gates, 247 So. 2d at 40 (Fla. 1971).
24. Id. at 44.
25. The cases which previously recognized the wife's cause of action are: Mis-
souri Pac. Transp. Co. v. Miller, 227 Ark. 351, 299 S.W.2d 41 (1957); Stenta v.
Leblang, 55 Del. 181, 185 A.2d 759 (1962); Brown v. Geo.-Tenn. Coaches, Inc., 88
Ga. App. 519, 77 S.E.2d 24 (1953); Nichols v. Sonneman, 91 Idaho 199, 418 P.2d 562
(1966); Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960); Troue v. Marker,
Inc., 252 N.E.2d 800 (Ind. 1969); Acuff v. Schmit, 248 Iowa 272, 78 N.W.2d 480
(1956); Kotsiris, v. Ling, 451 S.W.2d 411 (Ky. 1970); Deems v. Western Md. R. Co.,
[Vol. 9
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It was not until Yordon v. Savage" in 1973 that Florida recog-
nized that a wife's right to recover for loss of an injured minor child's
consortium applied equally to the husband's. There, the parents sued
for damages allegedly caused to their son by medical malpractice. The
defendant moved successfully to strike the mother from the plaintiffs'
complaint as an improper party. On direct appeal, the Florida Supreme
Court held that either or both parents had a cause of action for loss of
a child's consortium.2 7
Today, Florida law is beginning to recognize and protect the rights
of children in much the same way as the law developed rights for
women. Children have the right to freedom from abuse.2 8 They are pro-
tected by child labor laws. 9 They have the right to parental support.30
Florida children have a statutory right to counsel in juvenile proceed-
ings. 1 Florida has consistently recognized childrens' needs for nurtur-
ing, special care and sensitivity.32 Children also have the right to a free
public education. 33
Florida's legislature and its courts have expressly recognized that a
247 Md. 95, 231 A.2d 514 (1967); Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 101
N.W.2d 227 (1960); Thill v. Modern Erecting Co., 284 Minn. 508, 170 N.W.2d 865
(1969); Delta Chevrolet Company v. Waid, 211 Miss. 256, 51 So. 2d 443 (1951); No-
vak v. Kansas City Tr., 365 S.W.2d 539 (Mo. 1963); Duffy v. Lipsman-Fulkerson &
Co., 200 F.Supp. 71 (D. Mont. 1961); Cooney v. Moomaw, 109 F.Supp. 448 (D. Neb.
1953); Ekalo v. Constructive Serv. Corp. of America, 46 N.J. 82, 215 A.2d 1 (1965);
Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 22 N.Y.2d 498, 239 N.E.2d 897, 293
N.Y.S.2d 305 (1968); Clem v. Brown, 3 Ohio Misc. 167, 32 Ohio Op. 2d 477,-207
N.E.2d 398 (1965); Ross v. Cuthbert, 239 Or. 429, 397 P.2d 529 (1964); Hayes v.
Swenson, Pa. 14 D. & C.2d 708 (1957); Mariani v. Nanni, 95 R.I. 153, 185 A.2d 119
(1962); Hoekstra v. Helgeland, 78 S.D. 82, 98 N.W.2d 669 (1959); Page v. Scaramozi,
288 S.W. 2d 909 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956); Moran v. Quality Aluminum Casting Co., 34
Wis. 2d 542, 150 N.W.2d 137 (1967).
26. 279 So. 2d at 846 (Fla. 1973).
27. The Yordon court adopted the Wilkie reasoning and held that loss of paren-
tal consortium includes medical, hospital and related expenditures, costs of caring for
the child, as well as loss of the child's companionship, society and services.
28. FLA. STAT. § 768.21 (1983); see generally supra note 9.
29. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 212 (1982); FLA. STAT. § 450 (1983).
30. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 742.031 (1983).
31. FLA. STAT. § 39.071 (1983); see also State ex rel Alton v. Conkling, 421 So.
2d 1108 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (construing FLA. STAT. § 39.071 (1979)).
32. FLA. STAT. § 39.04(2)(e)(4) (1983) (child's right to have criminal charges
transferred for adjudicatory proceedings as a child).
33. School Bd. of Orange County v. Blackford, 369 So. 2d 689 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct.
App. 1979).
1984]
5
Romano: Recovery for Lost Parental Consortium: Nightmare or Breakthrough?
Published by NSUWorks, 1984
Nova Law Journal
child's need to have its parents' comfort, society and guidance to grow
into a healthy adult is "crucial."34 Obviously, the law cannot force par-
ents and their children to love each other. However, the beliefs ex-
pressed by the actions of the legislature and the courts clearly show
their recognition of the importance of such love.35 Furthermore, they
create a public policy which announces a desire to encourage family
strength and unity.36 Consequently, a spouse has a cause of action
against third parties for loss of consortium37 even though a spouse
could not get a mandatory injunction for love and affection or involun-
tary services. In addition, parents can sue third parties for tortiously
causing a loss of their children's services and consortium, even though
they cannot sue their child for a mandatory injunction to enforce such
right to services.38
III. Modern Law Developments
Tnere are more laws oday .than ever before which recognize and
protect children's rights.39 Every state has laws against child abuse.4 0
Nevertheless, twenty-nine states have not even considered the issue of
whether a child should have the right to recover for lost parental con-.
sortium against third parties.4 Seventeen states have refused to recog-
nize a child's right to recover for tortiously caused loss of his parents'
34. Finn v. Finn, 312 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 1975). FLA. STAT. § 23.131 (1983).
The Legislature finds and declares that the early childhood years are cru-
cial to the mental, physical and emotional development of children, and
that the experiences of early childhood years are highly significant with
respect to later development, including educational and vocational success.
The Legislature further recognizes the primary role and responsibility of
the family for the development of children and the importance of strength-
ening the family members' abilities to foster the development of young
children . ..
FLA. STAT. § 23.131 (1983).
35. See supra note 34.
36. See supra note 34.
37. See, e.g., Gates, 247 So. 2d 40.
38. See, e.g., Fox v. City of West Palm Beach, 383 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1967).
39. See generally supra note 9.
40. Id.
41. States which have not yet decided the issue are: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas,
Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Penn-
sylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Ver-
mont, Virginia, West Virginia and Wyoming.
[Vol. 9
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consortium.42 The District of Columbia also refused to recognize the
child's right based on statutes which have since been repealed.4 3 An
Iowa court recognized the cause of action," but the Iowa decision was
later overruled in Audubon-Exira Ready Mix, Inc. v. Ill. Central Gulf
R.R. Co.45 As a result of statutory construction, the Audubon court
decided that the Iowa legislature already granted the right.4" The Iowa
court did not disturb the reasoning of its previous case, however. Iowa
now recognizes the cause of action as a derivative, but not an indepen-
dent, cause of action. Federal courts sitting in Alaska,47 Nebraska48
and South Carolina4" rejected the cause of action, but none of the state
courts in those states have specifically addressed the issue. In each of
those three states, the Federal courts presumed that those states would
probably reject the cause of action if they had to address the issue.50
42. Turner v. Atlantic Ry. Co., 159 F.Supp. 590 (N.D. Ga. 1958); Jeune v. Dell
E. Webb Construction Co., 77 Ariz. 226, 269 P.2d 723 (1954), overruled on other
grounds, 108 Ariz. 580, 503 P.2d 803 (1972); Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19
Cal.3d 441, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302, 563 P.2d 858 (1977); Hinde v. Butler, 35 Conn. Supp.
292, 408 A.2d 668 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1979); W.J. Bremer, Co., Inc. v. Graham, 169
Ga. App. 115, 312 S.E.2d 806 (1984), cert. denied, 312 S.E.2d 787; Halberg v. Young,
41 Hawaii 634 (1957); Koskela v. Martin, 91 Ill. App. 3d 568, 414 N.E.2d 1148
(1980); Schmeck v. City of Shawnee, 647 P.2d 1263 (Kan. 1982); Kelly v. United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 353 So. 2d 349 (La. Ct. App. 1977), appeal dis-
missed, 357 So. 2d 1144 (La.); Salen v. Klomempken, 322 N.W.2d 736 (Minn. 1982);
Stout v. Kansas City Terminal R. Co., 172 Mo. App. 113, 157 S.W. 1019 (1913);
General Electric Co. v. Bush, 88 Nev. 360, 498 P.2d 366 (1972); Russell v. Salem
Transportation Co., 61 N.J. 502, 295 A.2d 862 (1972); DeAngelis v. Lutheran Medical
Center, 58 N.Y.2d 1053, 449 N.E.2d 406, 462 N.Y.S.2d 626, (1983); Morgel v.
Winger, 290 N.W.2d 266 (N.D. 1980); Gibson v. Johnston, 75 Ohio L. Abs. 413, 144
N.E.2d 310, (1956), appeal dismissed for want of debatable question, 166 Ohio St.
288, 2 Ohio Ops.2d 174, 141 N.E.2d 767; Northwest v. Presbysterian Intercommunity
Hospital, 631 P.2d 1377, a ffd, 652 P.2d 318 (Or. 1982).
43. Pleasant v. Washington Sand & Gravel Co., 104 App. D.C. 374, 262 F.2d
471 (1958).
44. Weitl v. Moes, 311 N.W.2d 259 (Iowa 1981) (permitting an independent
cause of action for lost parental consortium).
45. 335 N.W.2d 148 (Iowa 1983).
46. IOWA CODE ANN. § 611.22 (West 1983) (permitting the cause of action as a
derivative claim only).
47. Early v. United States, 474 F.2d 756 (9th Cir. 1973).
48. Hoesing v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 484 F. Supp. 478 (D. Neb. 1980).
49. Turner v. Atlantic Coastline Ry. Co., 159 F. Supp. 590 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
50. Early, 474 F.2d at 758; Hoesing, 484 F. Supp. at 478; Turner, 159 F. Supp.
at 590.
7
Romano: Recovery for Lost Parental Consortium: Nightmare or Breakthrough?
Published by NSUWorks, 1984
Nova Law Journal [Vol. 9
The three federal court decisions were in 1973, 1980 and 1958."' Of
the cases which rejected the cause of action, five were decided in the
1950's,52 six in the 1970's, 53 two in 1980,11 three in 1982,55 one in
1983,56 and one in 1984.57 The District of Columbia last addressed the
issue in 1958.58
Of the seventeen states which rejected a cause of action for a
child's loss of his parents' consortium, seven did not recognize the
wife's right to consortium at the time, either.59 Recognition of the
wife's cause of action seems to be almost a prerequisite for recognition
of a child's right to recover for the loss of parental consortium. Every
state which recognized the child's cause of action first recognized the
wife's cause of action for loss of her husband's consortium.6 0 Some of
these courts rejected only an independent cause of action for loss of
parental consortium, fearing double recovery. 61 In this context, double
recovery means that the child would recover once when the child's eco-
nomic, and arguably, non-economic, damages are recovered in the par-
ent's cause of action, and a second time when the child recovers for his
own cause of action for loss of parental consortium.
51. Early, 474 F.2d at 756; Hoesing, 484 F. Supp. at 478; Turner, 159 F. Supp.
at 590.
52. Jeune, 77 Ariz. at 226, 269 P.2d at 723; Turner, 159 F. Supp. at 590;
Halberg, 41 Hawaii at 634; Gibson, 75 Ohio L. Abs. at 413, 144 N.E. 2d at 310.
53. Borer, 19 Cal. 3d at 441, 563 P. 2d at 858, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 302; Hinde, 35
Conn. Supp. at 242, 408 A. 2d at 668; Kelly, 353 So. 2d at 349; Bush, 88 Nev. at 360,
448 P. 2d at 366; Russell, 61 N.J. at 502, 295 A. 2d at 862.
54. Koskela, 91 111. App. 3d at 568, 414 N.E. 2d at 1148; Morgel, 290 N.W. 2d
at 266.
55. Schmeck, 647 P.2d at 1263; Salen, 322 N.W.2d at 736; Northwest, 631 P.2d
at 1377.
56. De Angelis, 58 N.Y.2d at 1053, 449 N.E.2d at 406, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 626.
57. Bremer, 169 Ga. App. at 115, 312 S.E.2d at 806. Florida's Fifth District
Court of Appeal recognized the child's cause of action in Rosen, 449 So. 2d 359. How-
ever, it would be inaccurate to say that the State of Florida has recognized the action,
since the Florida Supreme Court has not yet resolved the issue.
58. Pleasant, 262 F.2d at 471.
59. These states are Arizona, Hawaii, Ohio, Washington, Connecticut, Louisiana
and Kansas. See supra note 42.
60. See supra note 25, which lists the cases from Iowa, Michigan and Wisconsin.
The Massachusetts case recognizing the wife's right is Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 364
Mass. 153, 302 N.E.2d 555 (1973).
61. The states rejecting the cause of action for fear of double recovery are: Cali-
fornia, Washington, D.C., Hawaii, Kansas, New Jersey and Washington. See supra
note 42.
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Five states have recognized a child's right to recover for loss of a
parent's consortium. 2 In Weitl v. Moes63 a pregnant mother of three
children suffered permanent brain damage and permanent blindness as
the result of medical malpractice. Her fetus was stillborn. In allowing
her three children to maintain a cause of action for loss of parental
consortium, the court reviewed Iowa law which already allowed causes
of action for spousal loss of consortium and for parental loss of a child's
consortium and found that loss of parental consortium is consistent
with these holdings. In addition, the Iowa court made a thorough anal-
ysis of the reasoning for and against the child's cause of action which
was later presented in Rosen.64
In Berger v. Weber,65 the court analyzed the arguments that dam-
ages were too speculative, that double recovery would result from rec-
ognition of the cause of action and that any changes should be made by
the legislature instead of the court. In Berger, the mother of a mentally
retarded girl was severely injured in an auto accident. The court held
that the child's damages were comparable to pain and suffering, intan-
gible losses in wrongful death actions and spousal loss of consortium.
The court went on to say "[e]valuating the child's damages is no more
speculative than evaluating these other types of intangible losses."66
Addressing the issue of double recovery the court held that recognition
of the child's cause of action would lessen the possibility of double re-
covery, since the jury would be required to consider the child's loss
separately from the parent's loss.67
Finally, the Berger court noted that other loss of consortium
claims were developed by the judiciary, and the child's claim was ap-
propriately decided there, too.68 In recognizing the child's cause of ac-
tion for loss of parental consortium, the Berger court said "[c]onvinced
as we are that we have too long treated the child as [sic] second-class
citizen or some sort of nonperson, we feel constrained to remove the
disability we have imposed."6 9
62. Weitl, 311 N.W.2d at 259; Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 413
N.E.2d 690 (Mass. 1980); Berger v. Weber, 303 N.W.2d 424 (Mich. 1981); Theama
by Bichler v. City of Kenosha, 344 N.W.2d 513 (Wis. 1984).
63. 311 N.W.2d at 259.
64. Id. at 265-70.
65. 303 N.W.2d at 424.
66. Id. at 427.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. But cf. id. (Levin, J., dissenting), for a thorough analysis of the reasoning
1984]
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The Supreme Court of Wisconsin addressed the issue in 1984 in
Theama by Bichler v. City of Kenosha.70 Robert Theama was severely
and permanently injured as the result of a motorcycle accident. Alleg-
edly, a pothole in a negligently maintained road was the proximate
cause of the accident. The Theama court adopted the cause of action
for a child's loss of consortium primarily because the court perceived
an increasing recognition and protection of children's rights throughout
society. 71 The Theama court also analyzed arguments similar to those
propounded in Weitl72 and Berger, and approved the reasoning of those
courts.
73
In Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc.,74 a father was negli-
gently injured while at work. The court recognized the children's right
to recover for loss of parental consortium where the children could
show that their dependence was not only economic, but also rooted in
"filial needs for closeness, guidance and nurture. '75 The Ferriter court
analyzed the traditional arguments similarly to the Weitl, Berger and
Theama courts, reaching the same conclusion that a minor child has a
cause of action for lost parental consortium where the parent is tor-
tiously injured.76
In Rosen by and through Rosen v. Zorzos,77 a negligently caused
automobile collision killed a young mother and severely injured her
husband. The parties settled before trial and the settlement included
damages for the children's loss of consortium for their deceased
mother, which is a recognized cause of action under Florida's Wrongful
Death Act.7 After settling with Michael Zorzos on the other claims,
Stephen Rosen filed a lawsuit on behalf of his children for their loss of
his companionship, guidance, love and the like.79 The lawsuit for the
children's loss of Mr. Rosen's consortium was dismissed for failure to
state a cause of action.80 On appeal, the Florida Fifth District reversed,
against acceptance of the child's cause of action.
70. See 344 N.W.2d at 513.
71. Id. at 517.
72. 311 N.W.2d at 259.
73. 303 N.W.2d at 424.
74. 413 N.E.2d at 690.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. 449 So. 2d at 359.
78. FLA. STAT. § 768.21(3) (1983).
79. Rosen, 449 So. 2d at 359.
80. Id.
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adopting reasoning similar to Weitl, Berger and Ferriter.a1
The most recent case addressing the issue whether a child should
be permitted a cause of action for lost parental consortium is Ueland v.
Pengo Hydra-Pull Corp.82 In Ueland, the court held that the child's
cause of action is consistent with other Washington law, which permits
a husband's cause of action for loss of his wife's services, a wife's cause
of action for loss of her husband's consortium and Washington's wrong-
ful death statute, which permits a cause of action for intra-family loss
of consortium. The Ueland court cited Rosen, Theama, Berger and
Ferriter and held that "the emerging trend is to recognize the child's
cause of action. 8 3 In permitting the cause of action, the Ueland court
held that the child's claim must be joined with the parent's claim un-
less there is just cause not to join the child's claim.
In contrast to the older cases rejecting the cause of action the
cases recognizing the child's right are relatively new.84 Arguably, this
contrast indicates the beginnings of a trend toward recognizing a minor
child'b iight to secuvui fIunm third parties for tortiously caused loss of
parental consortium when the parent is injured but does not die. Per-
haps those courts which have recognized the cause of action are judi-
cial renegades, as some charge.a5 On the other hand, it is at least
equally probable that they are the leading edge of the American judi-
cial system in this area. They do comprise almost forty percent of the
states which have addressed the issue in the last five years. These re-
cent cases, together with the increasing number of judicial decisions
and statutes recognizing and enforcing children's rights, suggest an in-
creasing legal recognition of children as persons. In addition, there is
an apparent heightened public interest in children's rights in general,
as evidenced by the almost daily media coverage of programs and
events concerning the needs and rights of children.
IV. Analysis of Arguments Against Recognition
There are eight reasons generally offered in opposition to recogniz-
81. Id.
82. Ueland v. Pengo Hydra-Pull Corp., 103 Wash. 2d 131 (1984).
83. Id.
84. Cases which rejected the cause of action are an average of more than twelve
years old. In contrast, those decisions which recognize the action were written, on an
average, less than four years ago. In Florida, Clark was decided nine years ago (1976),
whereas Rosen was decided only last year (1984).
85. Brief for Petitioner at 11, Rosen, 449 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984).
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ing a child's right to recover for lost parental consortium. They are: 1)
The child has no enforceable claim for the parents' services; 2) Ab-
sence of precedent; 3) Speculative nature of damages; 4) Double Re-
covery; 5) Multiplicity of litigation; 6) Possible upset of settlements
with parents; 7) Fabrication of claims; 8) Increased insurance costs.86
These reasons also form the basis of the petitioner's position in Rosen, 7
and are the same arguments used in opposition to recognizing a wife's
right to recover for lost consortium in Gates.88
In Florida, the Clark court rejected a claim for lost parental con-
sortium based on the above eight reasons. In addition, the Clark court
held that public policy as announced by the so-called heart balm8 9 stat-
ute proscribed the child's cause of actionY0 This statute abolished the
torts of alienation of affection, criminal conversation, seduction and
breach of contract to marry. The express legislative intent in the heart
balm statute was to stop the harassment, embarassment, blackmail and
other abuses which resulted from the torts. The Clark court did not
analyze the reasons it listed. it mereiy accepted them. However, even
the Clark court held that the argument for recognizing a child's right
to recover against third parties for lost parental consortium could have
merit from a public policy viewpoint if the "[c]laims asserted by the
plaintiffs were properly circumscribed."'"
A. The Argument That A Child Has No Enforceable Claim for
His Parents' Services.
It is true that a Florida child cannot obtain an injunction to force
his parents to love him and care for him.92 On the other hand, a child
in Florida does have an enforceable right to physical support.9 That
right is based on either parentage or contract.94 By way of analogy, it
should be noted that Florida's Wrongful Death Act9" does create the
86. See, e.g., Clark, 338 So. 2d
87. 449 So. 2d at 359.
88. 247 So. 2d at 40.
89. FLA. STAT. § 771 (1983) (
(1945)).
90. Clark, 338 So. 2d at 1119.
91. Id.
92. See, e.g., Fox v. City of W
93. Armour v. Allen, 377 So. 2
94. Albert v. Albert, 415 So. 2
95. FLA. STAT. § 768.21(3) (19
at 1117.
originally enacted as Ch. 23138, LAWS OF FLA.
est Palm Beach, 383 F. 2d 189 (5th Cir. 1967).
d 798 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
d 818 (Fla. 2nd Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
83).
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right of a child to recover for lost parental consortium when the parent
dies. A child certainly could not enforce that right against his dead
parent, but can recover against third parties.
B. Absence of Precedent.
"Every public action which is not customary, either is wrong or, if
it is right, is a dangerous precedent. It follows that nothing should ever
be done for the first time."' 96 While precedent is an important factor in
considering the wisdom of a decision, it should not be controlling. If
everyone failed to act until a precedent was set, there would be no
great legal decisions. On the other hand, previous landmark decisions
by the Florida Supreme Court such as abolition of contributory negli-
gence and lex loci conflicts of law, and the recognition of products lia-
bility causes of action and the seat belt defense show that lack of prece-
dent is not a sufficient reason to fail to make a sound judicial
decision. 97 Even if lack of precedent were a valid argument, it cannot
be applicable when the Florida Supreme Court decides Rosen. When
Clark was decided, there were no states that recognized the derivative
action. At this time five states judicially recognize such recovery for the
minor child.98 Nonetheless, at this time there are clearly more states
against a child's right to recover for loss of parental consortium than
are in favor of the cause of action.
C. Speculative Nature of the Award
The third argument is that damages for loss of consortium are too
speculative. One would expect that a jury would decide damages based
upon evidence of the parent-child relationship, viz: time spent together,
closeness, overall quality of the relationship. 99 Admittedly, it is impossi-
ble to put an absolute value on a father's or mother's love for a child.
However, the same valuation problem exists in measuring punitive
damages, physical and mental pain and suffering, diminished capacity
96. THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS, 162.23 (1979).
97. Gates, 247 So. 2d at 40; Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973) (ab-
rogation of contributory negligence); Bishop v. Florida Specialty Paint Co., 389 So. 2d
999 (Fla. 1980) (abrogation of lex loci conflicts of law doctrine); West v. Caterpillar
Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976) (adopting strict product liability); Ins. Co. of
North America v. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 1984) (seat belt defense).
98. See supra note 62.
99. See, e.g., Berger, 303 N.W.2d at 424.
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to earn, parents' loss of a child's consortium and spousal loss of consor-
tium. The courts have for several years permitted recovery for these
damages and, in fact, have found them necessary to insure fair and
adequate compensation. 10 The real issue is whether the speculation can
be reduced to tolerable levels. 1 1 Arguably, our country and our judicial
system have been modernized by allowing such noneconomic damages.
It is hard to see how loss of parental consortium is radically different.
Proper jury instructions and other safeguards, such as an elemental
definition and special verdicts, would keep speculation within tolerable
limits.
D. Double Recovery
A major concern with permitting a child's right for loss of parental
consortium is that the minor child will recover again for damages
which are already included in the parents' verdict for lost wages when
the child sues the same defendant.' This could, and probably would,
happen if the tort were to be recognized as an independent cause of
action. A child's loss of parental consortium, however, is more properly
classified as a derivative action. Requiring the child to join his claim
with the primary claim, 0 3 along with a limiting jury charge on the
child's claim and perhaps a special verdict, will obviate the problem.
Double recovery is a potential problem in any complicated or multiple
plaintiff case, but just as with the problem of speculation, courts are
sophisticated enough to deal with the complexities of each case to avoid
the occurrence of double recovery. The jury should always be alert to
guard against double recovery. 04
E. Multiplicity of Litigation
The opponents of the child's cause of action for lost parental con-
sortium fear that each child will bring separate suits and further tax
the already overburdened court system. Multiplicity of litigation was a
legitimate concern of the Gates court as well when that court recog-
100. See generally FLA. STAT. § 768.21 (1983).
101. See, e.g., General Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Dahlman, 310 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Bould v. Touchette, 349 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 1977).
102. See, e.g., Halberg v. Young, 41 Hawaii 634 (1957).
103. This notion is consistent with the requirement for spousal loss of consortium
claims and claims under Florida's Wrongful Death Act, FLA. STAT. § 768.21 (1983).
104. See, e.g., Berger, 303 N.W.2d at 427.
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nized a wife's cause of action for lost spousal consortium."0 5 The Gates
court addressed the problem by requiring the spouse to join her claim
in the primary complaint. The Rosen court could take the same ap-
proach with the child's claim for lost parental consortium. The Florida
legislature has also addressed this concern in a similar context. In en-
acting Florida's Wrongful Death Act, 106 the legislature addressed the
issue by requiring all parties who have claims arising out of the death
to raise them in a single complaint through the personal representative
of the estate. The same process of compulsory joinder will work effec-
tively in Rosen and its progeny. The children should be required to join
their claims for loss of parental consortium with the parent's claim.
F. Red Tape
Because a Florida statute requires court approval of all settlements
in excess of $5,000, made on behalf of minors, opponents of a cause of
action for a child's loss of parental consortium argue that the cause of
action will increase red tape.10 7 The statute would require approval in
loss of parental consortium cases as well as others. However, such ap-
proval does not preclude the child's claim for loss of parental consor-
tium in wrongful death cases. Arguably, there would be an increased
burden on the courts, but its impact would be minimal. Moreover, the
very existence of this statute illuminates Florida's public policy of rec-
ognizing and protecting the rights of its minor citizens. In enacting
such a safeguard, the Florida legislature demonstrated its recognition
of the vulnerability of children and its desire to guard their best
interests.
G. Upset of Previous Settlements
The opponents of recognition of a child's right to recover for lost
parental consortium argue that such recognition will upset previous set-
tlements.0 8 Unquestionably, retroactive recognition would cause such
results. The same concern arose in Gates v. Foley,0 9 but the court
stated that "[t]he problem has not troubled other courts seriously and
105. Gates, 247 So. 2d at 40.
106. FLA. STAT. § 768.21-.27 (1983).
107. FLA. STAT. § 744.387 (1983).
108. Brief for Petitioner at 32, Rosen, 449 So. 2d at 359. Oral argument was
heard January 10, 1985 (case no. 65239).
109. 247 So. 2d at 40.
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may be easily resolved." 110 The court allowed the wife's claim to be
joined with the husband's claim only if the wife's claim was not time-
barred and the husband's claim was still pending. Where the husband's
claim "has been terminated by adverse judgment on the merits, this
should bar the wife's cause of action for consortium." ''
In Rosen, the children brought their claim for loss of their father's
consortium after all other issues were settled out of court. However, the
Rosen family has had the willingness to pursue the issue. In addition,
the Florida Supreme Court has the unquestioned authority to recognize
this cause of action in Rosen and pending and prospective cases only. 1 2
Arguably, this is the only logical approach to take since it would avoid
reopening cases already settled. This method would also be consistent
with the court's decision in Gates,1 13 giving direction and stability to
Florida jurisprudence. In any case, the child's cause of action is only
for lost consortium, and not for anything the parent recovered. In addi-
tion, a jury instruction will clarify the fact that recovery for the chil-
dren should not include loss of financial support, which is already cov-
ered in the parent's settlement or verdict.
H. Fabrication of Claims
Fabrication of claims is a traditional argument in opposition to
causes of action arising from intra-family relationship. 1 The Florida
Supreme Court addressed the argument in Ard v. Ard, when it par-
tially abrogated parent-child tort immunity."15 The Ard court held that
the possibility of fraud does not constitute a valid justification to reject
the child's cause of action for negligent torts of the parent, since the
court can capably guard against fraud." 6 The court went on to reason
110. Id. at 45.
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 346 So. 2d 1012 (Fla.
1977) (prospective application of new rule requiring special verdicts in all comparative
negligence cases); In re Beverly, 342 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1977) (change in standard of
proof for civil commitment prospective application only); State ex rel Dade County v.
Nunzum, 372 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 1979) (prospective only application of revenue sharing
court order); Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980) (declaration of unconstitu-
tionality of medical malpractice act prospective only).
113. 247 So. 2d at 40.
114. Ard v. Ard, 414 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 1982).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1069.
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that the testimony of the family members would be extremely vulnera-
ble to impeachment and that juries are fully able to use their common
sense to arrive at the truth."1 ' The Ard court plainly discounted the
possibility of fraudulent claims as a good reason to bar a cause of ac-
tion or to grant relief.lla The opinion seems to state the court's feeling
in general, unrestricted to the Ard decision.
I. Insurance Rates
The final argument made in opposition to recognizing a child's
right to recover for lost parental consortium is that recoveries will raise
insurance rates. The argument is that society cannot afford to pay for
all types of losses. Assuming that recognition of the derivative action
would impact on insurance rates, a conflict of public policies arises. On
one hand, members of society want to be able to afford insurance. On
the other hand, they should be able to seek recovery for certain losses,
including insured losses. The issue then becomes whether recognition of
the derivative action would have a prohibitively adverse effect on insur-
ance rates.
Arguably, every insured loss affects insurance rates. Examples in-
clude a burning house, a destroyed car, appendicitis and thousands
more. Insurance rates are an important concern to the public, as are all
expenses. On the other hand, the public, through its purchase of nu-
merous types of non-required insurance coverages has arguably demon-
strated that it is far more interested in having insurance coverage in
the event of a loss than it is concerned about increased rates. The
child's right to recovery for lost parental consortium is consistent with
other allowable losses. The only reason to deny the action is that some
demarcation should be made to limit a wrongdoer's liability, and here
is where public policy draws the line.1 9
There is no reported or available evidence that the child's cause of
action will have a significant impact, if at all, on insurance rates. It is a
matter of common knowledge that rates differ according to risk catego-
ries. Drivers with bad driving records will pay higher rates than those
117. Id. (citing Brooks v. Robinson, 259 Ind. 16, 284 N.E.2d 794 (1972)).
118. Ard, 414 So. 2d at 1069.
119. Last year, the Florida Medical Association sponsored Proposition 9, a con-
stitutional amendment which would have limited recovery for non-economic damages
to $100,000.00. However, it did not meet the constitutional requirements to be allowed
on the ballot.
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with good records, and they should. There is no credible argument that
children should be denied full and fair compensation merely to main--
tain insurance rates for negligent wrongdoers.
The Florida Supreme Court has reviewed and rejected each of the
arguments raised in opposition to the child's cause of action in Clark2 '
and repeated in Rosen, 2' at one time or another and rejected them.'22
While some of these arguments present valid concerns, they are not,
individually or in aggregate, sufficient to bar a child's right to recover
for lost parental consortium.
V. Analysis of Arguments in Favor of Recognition
There should be a rational, positive basis to recognize a cause of
action. The reasons given in favor of the action in Rosen are: 1) Recog-
nition is consistent with Florida legislative enactment which recognizes
the claim when the parent dies; 23 2) Recognition is consistent with
Florida law which recognizes a claim for loss of a wife's consortium; 2 4
3) Recognition is consistent with Florida law which recognizes a par-
ent's right to recover for loss of a child's consortium; 12 5 and 4) Recog-
nition is required by the Florida Constitution." 6
A. Legislative Enactments Recognize The Cause of Action
The Florida Wrongful Death Act 127 allows minor children of the
decedent to "[r]ecover for lost parental companionship, instruction, and
guidance and for mental pain and suffering .... ,,1218 The legislative
intent is clearly stated in the statute. "It is the public policy of the
State to shift the losses resulting when wrongful death occurs from the
survivors of the decedent to the wrongdoer. ,,129 Turlington v.
120. 338 So. 2d at 1117.
121. 449 So. 2d at 359.
122. Gates, 247 So. 2d at 40; Rosen, 449 So. 2d at 359.
123. FLA. STAT. § 768.21 (1983).
124. Gates, 247 So. 2d at 40.
125. See Wilkie, 109 So. at 225.
126. Rosen, 449 So. 2d at 359. The Florida Constitution declares that: "The
courts shall be open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be
administered without sale, denial or delay." FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21.
127. FLA. STAT. § 768.16-.27 (1983).
128. FLA. STAT. § 768.21(3) (1983).
129. FLA. STAT. § 768.17 (1983).
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Tampa Electric Co.'3 0 stated similar public policy. In Tampa Electric
Co. the court stated, "[w]here, by virtue of the relationship toward
each other existing between parties, the law implies a duty from one to
another, a breach of that duty that proximately causes or contributes to
causing a substantial injury to another may constitute" an actionable
wrong. Thus, the legislative and judicial view in Florida is wholly con-
sistent with the general view that a person is responsible for all the
injuries that he negligently inflicts upon others. 3 '
Some argue that consortium always includes the husband-wife sex-
ual relationship and, therefore, excludes children. 132 However, Florida's
Wrongful Death Act lists each of the elements of consortium recover-
able by minor children and, of course, omits conjugal relations.'3 3 Logi-
cally, if the legislature allows the recovery, then it certainly recognizes
the real injury to a child who is deprived of his parents' "companion-
ship, instruction and guidance." 34 Any material disruption of the par-
ent-child relationship causes injury to the child. Providing a remedy for
the child whose parent is injured, but not killed, is consistent with Flor-
ida public policy as stated in the Wrongful Death Act.
B. Florida Recognizes Loss of Spousal Consortium
The issue of a wife's claim for loss of her husband's consortium
which was presented in Gates3 5 is parallel to the issue of lost parental
consortium in Rosen.3 6 The Gates court recognized that societal
changes in the woman's status required recognition of her right to re-
cover for loss of her husband's consortium. Like Rosen, the Gates court
referred to Florida Constitution Article I Section 21, as well as Sec-
tions 2 and 9. Unlike Rosen, Gates went on to discuss the wife's rights
under the United States Constitution and various federal statutes. 3 7
The Gates court reasoned that, in addition to state law and public pol-
icy, the federal constitution and federal laws against discrimination'38
mandated recognition of the wife's claim. The court held that discrimi-
130. 62 Fla. at 398, 56 So. at 696.
131. See, e.g., Barnfield v. Addington, 104 Fla. 661, 140 So. 893 (1932).
132. See, e.g., Tremblay v. Carter, 390 So. 2d 816 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
133. FLA. STAT. § 768.21 (1983).
134. Id.
135. 247 So. 2d at 40.
136. 449 So. 2d at 359.
137. Gates, 247 So. 2d at 40.
138. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
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nation on the basis of sex by not allowing a wife's cause of action for
loss of her husband's consortium was against federal law and was
unconstitutional.
Florida's recognition that a loss of a husband's consortium injures
a wife supports the view that loss of parental consortium injures a
child. Whereas a wife is supposedly a mature adult, the minor child
does not have the benefit of life's experience. The child is far more
dependent for guidance and nurture than the wife. Since the law recog-
nizes that a wife's loss of her husband's consortium is a real loss, a
fortiori, the child's loss of parental consortium is cognizable also for
the same reason.
C. Florida Recognizes A Parent's Right to a Child's
Consortium
In Florida, a parent has the right to sue for loss of a child's con-
sortium. 139 In Wilkie,'"1 the court noted that such right was not a com-
mon-law right, but it decided that, "[t]he father's right to the custody,
companionship, services, and earnings of his minor child are valuable
rights, constituting a species of property in the father, a wrongful in-
jury to which by a third person will support an action in favor of the
father."' "4 This cause of action was independent of the injured child's
right to recover for his direct injuries.
Arguably, an adult, who is also a parent, is far better equipped to
deal with emotional and financial crises. Yet Florida recognizes that
the injury of one's child creates a palpable loss in the parent. The same
reasoning leads to the conclusion that a child's injury caused by the
loss of parental consortium would be no less than a parent's loss. Rec-
ognizing the child's right to recover for lost parental consortium is con-
sistent with recognition of the parent's right to recover for loss of a
child's consortium. It is equivalent to recognizing a child as a complete
person.
D. The Florida Constitution Guarantees Redress of Any Injury.
The Rosen court held that recognition of a child's right to recover
139. Wilkie, 109 So. at 225.
140. Id.
141. Id. But see petitioner's brief, Rosen, 449 So. 2d at 359, which asserts that
recovery is limited to economic damages.
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for loss of parental consortium is required by the Florida Constitu-
tion.' 42 Article I, Section 21, states "[t]he courts shall be open to every
person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered with-
out sale, denial or delay." 43 The article's simplicity seems to defy any
attempt to interpret away the right insured by the provision.
The Constitution guarantees such an opportunity of redress for
any injury.144 Therefore, the question is whether the Florida Supreme
Court will decide that a child's loss of parental consortium is an injury.
If the decision is yes, then the court seems bound to affirm Rosen. Ar-
guably, the Florida Constitution does not require recognition if public
policy is better served by rejection of the child's cause of action. 4 5 Of
course, if the court decides there is no injury as a matter of law, public
policy or otherwise, then it will not recognize the cause of action any-
way. The court could probably recognize the injury but limit recovery
without violating the Florida Constitution. 46
Conclusion
Studies demonstrate conclusively that parents' love, society, sup-
port, training, role model and the like are essential to the physical,
mental and emotional health of children. 4 The incidence of juvenile
delinquency and psychological problems increases when there is a re-
duced functioning of the family unit. 48 This increased awareness and
scientific knowledge should contribute to the recognition of a child's
right to recover for loss of parental consortium.
By affirming the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Rosen, the Flor-
ida Supreme Court can write another important chapter in the history
of Florida jurisprudence. Recognition of the child's natural right to his
142. FLA. CONST. art 1, § 21 (1968).
143. Id.
144. Accord Ellison v. Northwest Eng'g Co., 521 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Fla. 1981)
(construing Fla. Const. art. I § 21 to allow workman to sue a manufacturer for breach
of implied warranty, negligence and strict liability).
145. See, e.g., Abdin v. Fischer, 374 So. 2d 1379 (Fla. 1979) (statute limiting
liability of owners and lessees who provide public park areas does not violate the consti-
tutional provision that the courts shall be open to every person for redress of any
injury).
146. See generally id.
147. B. BERELSON & G. STEINER, HUMAN BEHAVIOR: AN INVENTORY OF SCIEN-
TIFIC FINDINGS 316-17 (1964).
148. Id.
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parents' love, companionship, education and protection, will signal the
Court's continued belief that government is a servant of the people
rather than people the servants of government. Affirmance will be con-
sistent with the court's policy of protecting the rights and needs of
Florida's fast changing society. This policy was previously laid down in
cases where the Court abrogated the contributory negligence rule,149
where it abrogated the obsolete doctrine of lex loci delecti,150 where it
adopted strict liability in tort and product cases,' 5' and where it
adopted the seat belt defense, 52 to name a few.
When little Mary Ellen had nowhere to turn, the courts protected
her natural rights, even though previous law did not. The case of
"Mary Ellen" was a social breakthrough in 1894.111 Now, the Florida
Supreme Court is presented with the opportunity to make another posi-
tive social breakthrough. By affirming Rosen, the court will continue
society's movement toward recognizing and protecting the rights and
needs of its children.
Rodney Guy Romano
149. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
150. Bishop v. Fla. Specialty Plant Co., 389 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1980).
151. West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976).
152. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 457.
153. See supra note 8.
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